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Statutory Purpose in the Rollback Wars 
ALICE KASWAN† 
 
The Trump Administration has been rolling back environmental and other regulations at a 
rapid rate. Each time, they are called upon to interpret their authorizing statutes. As they 
reverse previous administrations’ regulations, how do their new interpretations address the 
statutes’ fundamental objectives? In this Essay, I assess one part of the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)’s and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s 
rollback of clean car standards: a regulation stating that the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act (EPCA) preempts California’s trailblazing controls on vehicles’ greenhouse gas 
emissions. I argue that the agency preemption analysis gave insufficient attention to 
Congress’s explicit statutory purposes, largely ignoring EPCA’s energy-conservation goals 
and the Clean Air Act (CAA)’s and California’s environmental goals. This lack of fidelity to 
the statutes’ fundamental purposes and values has significant consequences. From a systemic 
perspective, unmoored from the statutes’ core purposes, the agency is freely pursuing an anti-
regulatory agenda that runs contrary to congressional intent. From an environmental 
standpoint, the rule compromises the nation’s capacity to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions from and promote essential technological innovation in the transportation sector, 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the environmental context, the Trump Administration has been on a roll. 
Or, a rollback, to be more precise. As of May 2020, the New York Times reports 
that the Trump Administration had proposed or finalized 100 rollbacks to 
environmental rules, Executive Orders, guidance documents, and other 
initiatives instituted by previous administrations.1 
The rollbacks do not tinker at the margin. Many have major implications 
for the environment and regulated industry. Rolling back the Obama 
Administration’s Clean Water Rule and replacing it with the Navigable Waters 
Protection Rule substantially reduces the wetlands protected by federal law and 
eliminates jurisdiction over many western streams.2 Replacing the Obama 
Administration’s Clean Power Plan, which took into account the utilities’ 
capacity to shift away from GHG-intensive coal-fired power,3 with the 
Affordable Clean Energy Rule,4 which focuses only on improving coal-plant 
efficiency, will shrink the CAA’s capacity to engender the best systemic 
approaches to emissions reduction.5 The Council on Environmental Quality’s 
recent proposal to reinterpret the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)’s 
environmental impact statement requirements to reduce their coverage and limit 
agencies’ time will “streamline”—and lessen the quality of—environmental 
assessments of large-scale infrastructure projects.6 
 
 1. Nadja Popovich et al., The Trump Administration Is Reversing Nearly 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s 
the Full List, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks. 
html (last updated May 20, 2020). 
 2. See The Navigable Waters Protection Rule, Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 85 Fed. Reg. 
22,250, 22,251 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R pt. 328; 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 
230, 232, 300, 302, 401) (explaining that the rule covers only “perennial and intermittent” streams that flow 
regularly into navigable waters, not ephemeral streams, like those in the western states, that flow only when it 
rains). Excluding ephemeral streams and flows that run only in response to weather events eliminates jurisdiction 
over eighteen percent of U.S. waterways overall and, in the western states, could remove federal jurisdiction 
over the majority of streams. Ariel Wittenberg, Final WOTUS Rule Drains Wetland Protections, E&E NEWS: 
GREENWIRE (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1062159101/search?keyword= 
Clean+Water+rule. The Navigable Waters Protection Rule also narrowed the definition of “adjacent wetlands” 
to those with a surface connection to navigable waters or separated by a natural berm or bank. See The Navigable 
Waters Protection Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,251. 
 3. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating 
Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,667 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 4. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). Some 
researchers predict that the power plant efficiency investments generated by the rule could lead utilities to 
operate their coal-fired power plants more intensively, leading to increases rather than decreases in emissions. 
See Amelia T. Keyes et al., The Affordable Clean Energy Rule and the Impact of Emissions Rebound on Carbon 
Dioxide and Criteria Air Pollutant Emissions, 14 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Apr. 9, 2019, at 3. 
 5. See Umair Irfan, Trump’s EPA Just Replaced Obama’s Signature Climate Policy with a Much Weaker 
Rule, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2019/6/19/18684054/climate-change-clean-power-plan-repeal-affordable-
emissions (last updated June 19, 2019). Irfan indicates that the rule is expected to prompt only about a one 
percent reduction in emissions by 2030, a small effect in light of current emission reduction trends. Id. 
 6. Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental 
Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 1,684 (Jan. 10, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500–08); see Zackary D. Knaub 
et al., Trump Administration Proposes Significant Streamlining of National Environmental Policy Act, NAT’L L. 
REV. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/trump-administration-proposes-significant-stream 
lining-national-environmental-policy (describing the potential impact of the proposed regulatory changes); 
Robert L. Glicksman & Alejandro E. Camacho, The Trump Card: Tarnishing Planning, Democracy, and the 
Environment, 50 ENVTL. L. REP. 10281 (2020) (detailing how CEQ’s “streamlining” proposal expands 
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These rollbacks raise a host of cross-cutting and statute-specific 
interpretive questions. As any student of government or administrative law 
knows, statutes are not self-executing. When agencies develop the specific 
regulations necessary to implement the statutes they administer, they are tasked 
with interpreting the law to best effectuate congressional intent. 
In this Essay, I focus on one issue: the role of statutory purpose in agencies’ 
statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is, of course, all about 
discerning congressional intent. But there are multiple avenues for determining 
Congress’s intent, including focusing on the text’s plain meaning, considering a 
provision in its statutory context, statutory history, and legislative history. I 
argue that these techniques do not operate in a vacuum. Grounded in statutory 
text, statutory purposes establish the core substantive values a statute was 
designed to address and should play an indispensable role in statutory 
interpretation. 
Courts and scholars have also long addressed the relative role of text and 
purposes in interpreting statutes.7 In recent years, courts have increasingly 
focused on analyzing statutory text and been reluctant to delve into analyses of 
statutory purposes that are ascertained from legislative history, an approach 
exemplified in Bostock v. Clayton County, a high-profile case decided as this 
Essay went to press.8 As we consider the Administration’s rollbacks, the debate 
is not between sticking to the statutory text versus cherry-picking purposes from 
indeterminate legislative history. Instead, I suggest that the agencies are giving 
insufficient weight to the statutes’ explicit statutory purposes, as enshrined in 
either the language or the structure of the statutes. In other words, statutory 
purposes are text too. 
Rather than canvass the whole range of Trump Administration rollbacks, I 
focus on one specific and important example: NHTSA’s rollback of California’s 
authority to control GHG emissions from motor vehicles, authority granted to 
California by the federal CAA.9 
NHTSA’s preemption rule, a key building block for the car standard’s 
rollback, gives insufficient weight to the CAA’s explicit health and welfare 
purposes and the role of California in effectuating them, and also risks 
subordinating these purposes to the Administration’s crabbed view of EPCA’s 
clearly articulated goals. Moreover, NHTSA overstates the “conflict” between 
the CAA and EPCA by failing to acknowledge EPCA’s fundamental goal: 
reducing fuel consumption. In failing to adhere to the statutes’ fundamental 
purposes and values, the agencies have compromised the nation’s capacity to 
 
exceptions, reduces analysis of reasonable alternatives, imposes arbitrary time and length limitations, and makes 
numerous other changes likely to weaken the integrity of agency environmental reviews). 
 7. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing 
and comparing textualist and purposivist approaches to statutory interpretation); John F. Manning, What Divides 
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) (same). 
 8. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-1618 (Sup. Ct. June 15, 2020) (relying on text, a 6-3 majority 
interpreted Title VII’s explicit prohibition against sex discrimination to apply to LGBTQ and transgender 
discrimination). 
 9. See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 
Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533). 
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curb GHG emissions from and promote essential technological innovation in the 
transportation sector, the nation’s largest emissions source. 
In critiquing the car rollback, I am not suggesting that agency 
interpretations should be static. Different presidents are entitled to interpret 
statutes differently from their predecessors,10 subject to administrative law 
principles designed to avoid arbitrary government action.11 As Aaron Nielson 
explains in this Issue, the appropriate degree of flexibility—the value of 
stickiness versus responsiveness—is contested.12 My concern about this 
rollback, and others, does not turn on or resolve these difficult tradeoffs. 
Instead, I argue that the Trump Administration’s motor vehicle emissions 
rollback evidences a lack of fidelity to statutory purpose. Despite purporting 
such fidelity, the agency’s reasoning appears to be driven by a deregulatory 
agenda that gives short shrift to the statutes the Administration is tasked with 
implementing. Whether maintaining or shifting the rules, agencies owe 
Congress a deep and honest engagement with the central substantive values at 
the heart of the statutes they are obliged to interpret. 
Part I illuminates what is at stake in the vehicle emissions rollback, 
explaining the threat posed by climate change, the increasing necessity to 
transition to a clean, fossil-free economy, and the role of motor vehicle 
emissions in that process. Part II explains the trajectory of California’s vehicle 
emission standards, tracing their emergence, their amplification to address 
GHGs and promote emission-free technologies, and their fate under the Trump 
Administration. Part III argues that the Administration’s approach shortchanges 
the statutory purposes served by both the EPCA and the CAA. In so doing, the 
Administration has undermined congressional intent and is standing as a 
roadblock to the evolution of the regulatory and technological innovations 




 10. In her article Presidential Administration, now-Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan argued that 
presidential influence on administrative agencies is legitimate and offers systemic benefits. Elena Kagan, 
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–46 (2001). It should be noted, however, that Justice 
Kagan did not suggest that the ascendancy of a new president, alone, provided a compelling argument for 
deference to presidential control. Id. at 2334. 
 11. The Supreme Court has established parameters for agency interpretive shifts in a trio of cases. In Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm, responding to the Reagan Administration’s revocation of car 
safety rules, the Court stated that, when an agency changes its position, it must “supply a reasoned analysis for 
the change beyond that which may be required when the agency does not act in the first instance.” Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). More recently, in FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., addressing a new interpretation of what constitutes on-air obscenity, the Justices 
appeared to agree that agencies must explain policy changes and why they believe the new interpretation is 
superior. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (plurality opinion). Lastly, in Encino 
Motorcars, the Court held that agencies must provide a “reasoned explanation” as to why they are disregarding 
facts and circumstances relevant to the earlier policy. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–
26 (2016). 
 12. Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations and Restoring Internet Freedom, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 1209 (2020); 
see also William W. Buzbee, The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency in Administrative Law, 98 
B.U. L. REV. 1357 (2018). 
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I.  WHAT’S AT STAKE: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE DECARBONIZATION 
IMPERATIVE, AND MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSIONS 
A. EMERGING CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS 
The consequences of climate change are already here. According to the 
Fourth National Climate Assessment conducted by the U.S. Global Change 
Research Program, since 1901 average global temperatures have increased by 
almost two degrees, leading to the warmest period “in the history of modern 
civilization[,] . . . and the last three years have been the warmest years on record 
for the globe.”13 Average U.S. temperatures are projected to increase by another 
2.5 degrees by 2050.14 
More concerning, from a public health perspective, are persistent heat 
waves. The frequency of extreme heat waves has been increasing since the mid-
1960s,15 and their frequency and intensity are expected to continue to increase.16 
Heat is particularly dangerous to the elderly, socially and economically 
vulnerable populations, those who are socially isolated, and those who do not 
have or cannot afford to run air conditioning.17 
Since 1900, average sea levels have increased by approximately seven to 
eight inches, with a three-inch increase in just the last couple of decades.18 
Global sea levels are expected to rise by one to four feet by 2100,19 and could 
rise even more if the polar ice caps deteriorate.20 Higher sea levels have triggered 
higher tides, which are causing tidal flooding “in more than 25 Atlantic and Gulf 
Coast cities,”21 as well as in low-lying coastal communities on the West Coast.22 
Warmer seas generate more intense hurricanes.23 Climate change is also 
impacting precipitation, with heavier rainfall (and flood risk) in the eastern half 
of the United States, with the greatest increases in the Northeast.24 Higher sea 
levels and more intense storms will trigger higher storm surge that “will increase 
the frequency and extent of extreme flooding associated with coastal storms.”25 
 
 13. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME I: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 (2018), https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR_Executive_ 
Summary.pdf. 
 14. Id. at 11. 
 15. Id. at 19. 
 16. Id. at 21. 
 17. Colleen E. Reid et al., Mapping Community Determinants of Heat Vulnerability, 117 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 1730, 1733 (2009). Factors contributing to social and economic vulnerability include education levels, 
poverty, race, and the prevalence of green space. Id. 
 18. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 10. 
 19. Id. In the Northeast and in the western parts of the Gulf of Mexico, localized sea level rise is expected 
to be higher than the global average. Id. at 26. 
 20. Id. In February 2020, scientists documented that warm sea water beneath a massive glacier in the 
Antarctic is leading to accelerated melt levels and instability. This melt could, on its own, raise global sea levels 
by almost two feet. Jeff Tollefson, First Look Under Imperiled Antarctic Glacier Finds “Warm Water Coming 
from All Directions”, NATURE (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00497-4. 
 21. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 10. 
 22. See Anne C. Mulkern, Calif. City with Water on 3 Sides Faces Grim Future, E&E NEWS (Dec. 14, 
2017), https://www.eenews.net/special_reports/california_crumbling_coast/stories/1060069003. 
 23. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 22. 
 24. Id. at 20. 
 25. Id. at 27. 
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The flooding and devastation caused by Superstorm Sandy and Hurricanes 
Katrina, Maria, and Harvey provide a glimpse of the human and economic 
consequences of increasingly intense storms coupled with rising seas. In the long 
term, as coastal and riparian communities and infrastructure confront repeated 
risks and damage, analysts predict the need to retreat from highly vulnerable 
areas.26 One study, focusing only on sea level rise, predicts about thirteen million 
domestic migrants by 2100.27 
In the West, the problem will be too little, not too much, precipitation. 
Scientists predict less rainfall and greater drought risk.28 That, combined with 
higher temperatures, is creating a tinderbox for large wildfires.29 In California, 
the regional utility’s poorly maintained transmission lines have garnered the 
spotlight.30 But these power lines have existed for decades; what is new are the 
fire-ready conditions created by changing weather patterns. 
The list of climate impacts in the United States and around the globe could 
go on. The precise timing and intensity of various effects remains contested. But 
there is little question that climate change is happening and that, without 
dramatic measures, it will cause severe environmental, economic, and social 
disruption within the coming decades. 
B. MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE DECARBONIZATION IMPERATIVE 
 Climate change is not like the other pollution problems we have 
encountered. We are not seeking reductions on the margins. Instead, scientists 
contend that we will need to decarbonize to avoid the worst climate change 
impacts. In 2017, the U.S. Global Research Program, in its National Climate 
Assessment, stated that stabilizing global temperatures to under two degrees 
Celsius “above preindustrial levels requires substantial reductions in net global 
CO2 emissions prior to 2040 . . . and likely requires net emissions to become 
zero or possibly negative later in the century.”31 
 
 26. Mathew E. Hauer, Migration Induced by Sea-Level Rise Could Reshape the US Population Landscape, 
7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 321, 321 (2017). 
 27. Id. 
 28. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 22. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Morgan McFall-Johnsen, Over 1,500 California Fires in the Past 6 Years—Including the Deadliest 
Ever—Were Caused by One Company: PG&E. Here’s What It Could Have Done But Didn’t, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Nov. 3, 2019, 6:52 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/pge-caused-california-wildfires-safety-measures-
2019-10. 
 31. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 31. The National Climate Assessment 
assumes the goal of stabilizing global temperatures at no more than two degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit).  
Id. at 32. Scientists have long believed that the worst impacts of climate change could be avoided by achieving 
that goal. See Nathan Hultman, We’re Almost Out of Time: The Alarming IPCC Climate Report and What To 
Do Next, BROOKINGS (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/were-almost-out-of-time-the-
alarming-ipcc-climate-report-and-what-to-do-next/ (“[D]iscussion across government and civil 
society . . . increasingly cohered around the concept that there appeared to be more extreme and significantly 
worrying risk . . . beyond about 2 degrees of warming.”). In recent years, however, climate scientists have been 
increasingly concerned that catastrophic impacts could occur at lower levels of warming, concerns that were 
validated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 2018 evaluation of potential impacts at 1.5 
degrees Celsius of warming. Id. 
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Decarbonization means replacing our reliance on fossil fuel combustion 
across all sectors: industry, electricity supply, vehicles, and buildings. Although 
some sources, like air travel, might not be able to achieve complete 
decarbonization, analysts suggest that vehicle emissions can and should be 
substantially reduced, largely by electrifying vehicles and then decarbonizing 
electricity generation.32 
C. THE ROLE OF MOTOR VEHICLES 
Motor vehicle emissions are a critical piece of the puzzle. Nationally, 
transportation contributed nearly twenty-eight percent of U.S. GHG emissions 
in 2018, the largest single sector, slightly exceeding emissions from the electric 
power sector.33 Passenger vehicles contribute around half of the nation’s 
transportation emissions.34 
In California, the only state with the authority to set its own vehicle 
emission standards, the transportation sector’s contribution to overall GHG 
emissions in 2017 was forty percent,35 considerably greater than the power 
sector’s fifteen percent contribution.36 Although renewable energy has steadily 
reduced the electricity sector’s share of emissions,37 and California’s vehicle 
emission standards and other transportation strategies have reduced 
transportation emissions somewhat relative to 2000 levels, progress has been 
slow.38 Continued efforts are necessary to maintain and accelerate vehicle 
decarbonization. 
To be clear, vehicle emission standards are not the only mechanism for 
reducing transportation GHG emissions. Reducing the transportation sector’s 
emissions will require many and diverse strategies in the short- and long-term, 
including increasing public transit options, preventing an increase in sprawl, 
making communities bikeable and walkable, and decreasing the carbon content 
of fuels.39 Within this array of options, however, eliminating the internal 
combustion engine and replacing it with electricity or some other non-carbon 
emitting source is essential.40 As discussed below, California has played a 
 
 32. See JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., U.S. DEEP DECARBONIZATION PATHWAYS PROJECT, POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 49–50, 58 (2015), http://usddpp.org/ 
downloads/2015-report-on-policy-implications.pdf; see also Amy L. Stein & Joshua Fershée, Decarbonizing 
Light-Duty Vehicles, 48 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,596 (2018) (analyzing the role of light-duty vehicles in emissions 
and decarbonization). 
 33. EPA, DRAFT INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2018, at 26–27 
(2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-02/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2020-chapter-execu 
tive-summary.pdf. 
 34. Stein & Fershée, supra note 32, at 10,596–97. 
 35. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CALIFORNIA GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOR 2000 TO 2017: TRENDS OF 
EMISSIONS AND OTHER INDICATORS 7 (2019), https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/pubs/reports/2000_2017/ 
ghg_inventory_trends_00-17.pdf. 
 36. Id. at 9. 
 37. Id. at 9–10. 
 38. See id. at 7–8, figs.5, 6, & 7 (showing a gradual decline in CO2 emissions). 
 39. Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253, 258–66 (2009) 
(discussing the importance of land use patterns to reducing transportation sector emissions). 
 40. Of course, electrifying transportation will not achieve decarbonization unless the electricity sector is 
also decarbonized. See Stein & Fershée, supra note 32, at 10,599. 
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leadership role in promoting pollution-free vehicles, a role substantially 
compromised by the Administration’s rollback. 
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF CALIFORNIA’S VEHICLE EMISSION STANDARDS 
A. CALIFORNIA’S VEHICLE EMISSION STANDARDS IN FEDERAL CONTEXT 
Under the CAA, EPA has the primary authority to establish vehicle 
emission standards.41 EPA has promulgated standards for passenger vehicles, 
light trucks, and heavy-duty trucks for pollutants such as nitrogen oxides, carbon 
monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and other hazardous substances.42 
The CAA preempts state vehicle emission standards43—with one critical 
exception. The law gives California44 the authority to develop its own vehicle 
emission standards and requires EPA to waive preemption so long as the state 
standards will be as protective as the applicable federal standards.45 However, 
EPA will not grant a waiver if it concludes that the state standards are arbitrary 
and capricious, are not needed “to meet compelling and extraordinary 
conditions,” or are not consistent with the factors EPA considers in setting motor 
vehicle standards.46 EPA has granted tens of waivers for California’s vehicle 
emissions standards as they have evolved over the last fifty years.47 
In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Congress gave the California 
exception national relevance. Congress added a new provision that gave all 
states two vehicle emission options: it allowed the other forty-nine states to 
choose either the California or the federal standards.48 Thirteen states have 
adopted California’s criteria pollutant and GHG vehicle emission standards.49 
These states, plus California, represent approximately thirty-six percent of the 
 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2018). 
 42. See, e.g., Control of Air Pollution from Motor Vehicles: Tier 3 Motor Vehicle Emission and Fuel 
Standards, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,414, 23,417 (Apr. 28, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 79, 80, 85, 86, 600, 
1036, 1037, 1039, 1042, 1048, 1054, 1065, 1066) (establishing new vehicle emission standards for sulfur, 
nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, and a range of air toxics for 
passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and heavy-duty trucks). See generally Regulations for Smog, Soot, and Other 
Air Pollution from Passenger Cars & Trucks, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-
engines/regulations-smog-soot-and-other-air-pollution-passenger  (last visited June 28, 2020) (listing motor 
vehicle regulations). 
 43. § 7543(a). 
 44. The statute refers to “any State which has adopted standards . . . prior to March 30, 1966.” Id. § (b)(1). 
California was the only state to have adopted standards as of that date. History, CAL. AIR RES. BD., 
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/about/history (last visited June 28, 2020). 
 45. § 7543(b)(1). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/state-and-
local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations (last visited June 28, 2020) (listing 
EPA responses to California waiver and authorization requests). 
 48. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 207, 91 Stat. 685, 755 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 7543). 
 49. CAL. AIR RES. BD., STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED CALIFORNIA’S VEHICLE STANDARDS UNDER 
SECTION 177 OF THE FEDERAL CLEAN AIR ACT (Aug. 19, 2019), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-
10/ca_177_states.pdf. 
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national car market.50 As a result, California’s vehicle emission standards play 
a significant national role. 
B. MOTOR VEHICLE GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVES 
California’s first major climate change statute addressed transportation 
emissions. Assembly Bill No. 1493, adopted in 2002, required the California Air 
Resources Board to set GHG emission standards for vehicles.51 The state’s first 
standards, adopted in 2004, applied to new passenger vehicles for model years 
2009 through 2016.52 
Meanwhile, at the federal level, environmental groups petitioned EPA to 
set GHG emission limits for automobiles, a petition the Bush Administration 
denied, claiming the CAA did not give it the authority to regulate GHGs.53 States 
and environmental groups sued, resulting in the landmark 2007 Supreme Court 
case Massachusetts v. EPA, which held that GHGs are “air pollutants” under the 
CAA, and that EPA therefore had the requisite statutory authority to set vehicle 
emission standards for GHGs.54 
In 2009, at the beginning of the Obama Administration, EPA granted 
California’s request for a CAA preemption waiver for its GHG vehicle emission 
standards.55 At the same time, the President moved to develop federal GHG 
vehicle emission standards.56 Under the Administration’s approach, in 2009, 
NHTSA and EPA promulgated compatible fuel economy and GHG standards 
for model years 2012 through 2016.57 The federal agencies, in turn, coordinated 
with California.58 Although each agency retained its own standards, the 
interagency and cross-jurisdictional coordination provided greater clarity and 
consistency for automakers. Thereafter, the federal and state stakeholders 
proceeded to develop additional fuel economy and GHG standards for model 
years 2017 through 2025.59 
California’s requirements have long recognized the limits of tailpipe 
controls in addressing the fundamental pollution challenge posed by vehicle-
 
 50. Id. 
 51. A.B. 1493, 2001–02 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2002) (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42823 and 
adding § 43018.5) (requiring the state agency to develop regulations for the “maximum feasible and cost-
effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles” by 2005). 
 52. Low-Emission Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Program, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-
work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/lev-program/low-emission-vehicle-greenhouse-gas (last visited 
June 28, 2020). California applied for a waiver from EPA in 2005. Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s 
National Auto Policy: Lessons from the “Car Deal”, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 349 (2011). 
 53. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510–14 (2007) (describing the fate of environmental groups’ 
rulemaking petition). 
 54. Id. at 528–29. 
 55. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of 
Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009). 
 56. See Freeman, supra note 52, at 344. 
 57. Id. at 345 n.6. 
 58. Office of Transp. & Air Quality, EPA, EPA Will Propose Historic Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles (May 2009), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100JPPD.pdf. 
 59. Office of Transp. & Air Quality, EPA, EPA and NHTSA, in Coordination with California, Announce 
Plans to Propose Greenhouse Gas and Fuel Economy Standards for Passenger Cars and Light Trucks (July 
2011), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100EG12.pdf. 
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specific combustion engines. Facing extreme levels of air pollution, in 1990 the 
state began to promote the development of non-combustion-based technologies 
by requiring automakers to produce zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) and offer 
them for sale in the state, beginning in model year 1998.60 The program’s 
requirements have ebbed and flowed over the years, and incorporated low-
emission vehicles (LEVs), like hybrid cars, as well as ZEVs.61 Through its 
various iterations, EPA has consistently found that the state meets the CAA 
criteria for a preemption waiver.62 
By 2012, the State deepened its commitment to alternative vehicles. Its 
“Advanced Clean Cars” program is a comprehensive program that integrates 
emission reduction objectives for GHGs and for pollutants having more direct 
health impacts.63 Heightened ZEV requirements are a central component of the 
program.64 EPA approved a waiver for the Advanced Clean Cars program, 
including the more demanding GHG vehicle emission standards and higher ZEV 
mandates, in 2013.65 Ten states have opted to implement California’s ZEV 
program, and, as noted above, these ten states plus California comprise 
approximately thirty percent of the national car market.66 
C. NHTSA’S PREEMPTION OF CALIFORNIA’S VEHICLE EMISSION STANDARDS 
In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed rolling back the next set of 
federal GHG vehicle emission standards and forestalling California, and the 
states following California, from continuing to regulate GHG emissions and 
require ZEVs. After explaining EPCA’s fuel economy standard and introducing 
the Administration’s range of vehicle standard rollbacks, this section narrows in 
on NHTSA’s interpretation of EPCA’s preemptive reach. 
1. The Rollback Proposals 
The Administration’s rollback of California’s GHG vehicle emission 
programs is inextricably linked to the Administration’s interpretation of EPCA’s 
fuel economy standards, set by NHTSA.67 Unlike vehicle emission standards, 
which limit pollution to a specified number of grams per mile,68 fuel economy 
 
 60. Virginia McConnell et al., California’s Evolving Zero Emission Vehicle Program: Pulling New 
Technology into the Market 3, 6 (Res. for the Future, Working Paper No. 19-22, 2019), https://media.rff.org/ 
documents/RFF_WP_Californias_Evolving_Zero_Emission_Vehicle_Program.pdf. 
 61. Id. at 3–4, 7. 
 62. Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, supra note 47. 
 63. Advanced Clean Cars Program, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/ 
advanced-clean-cars-program (last visited June 28, 2020). 
 64. McConnell et al., supra note 60, at 4. 
 65. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of 
Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s Advanced Clean Car Program and a Within the Scope Confirmation 
for California’s Zero Emission Vehicle Amendments for 2017 and Earlier Model Years, 78 Fed. Reg. 2,112 
(Jan. 9, 2013). 
 66. CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 49. 
 67. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a) (2018). 
 68. See Freeman, supra note 52, at 346. 
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standards establish minimum miles per gallon requirements.69 Automakers must 
produce a fleet of vehicles that, on average, and across all makes and models in 
the relevant category, meet the applicable fuel economy standards.70 
In August 2018, NHTSA and EPA proposed a three-part package to roll 
back federal GHG vehicle emission standards and prevent California from 
developing and implementing standards on its own.71 First, the agencies 
proposed freezing federal GHG emission standards at existing levels and 
eliminating increases that were to unfold for model years 2021 through 2026.72 
To prevent California (and states following California standards) from 
continuing to control GHG emissions, NHTSA proposed a rule interpreting 
EPCA to preempt California’s GHG standards as well as its ZEV program.73 
Third, EPA revoked its 2013 waiver for California’s Advanced Clean Car 
program, which encompassed both the more stringent GHG standards and its 
ZEV program.74 
In September 2019, NHTSA and EPA finalized the preemption rule and 
waiver revocation.75 The following spring, the agencies rolled back the federal 
GHG vehicle emission standards.76 If the agency had only rolled back the federal 
emission standards, California and the states choosing the California option 
could have maintained their more stringent vehicle emission standards. By 
revoking the EPA waiver, California lost the authority to maintain its current 
standards. The preemption rule solidifies the result, preempting the current 
regulations and precluding future state GHG controls. In addition, because 
California’s ZEV requirements are designed to achieve both local pollution and 
GHG reduction goals, revoking the waiver for the ZEV program could 
undermine California’s and other states’ ability to address persistent local air 
pollution and meet the nation’s air quality standards.77 
 
 69. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b) (2018). The fuel economy standards are known as “corporate average fuel 
economy standards” or “CAFE” standards. See Corporate Average Fuel Economy, NHTSA, https://www. 
nhtsa.gov/laws-regulations/corporate-average-fuel-economy (last visited June 28, 2020). 
 70. § 32902(b). 
 71. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 Passenger 
Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (proposed Aug. 24, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86; 
49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536, 537). 
 72. Id. at 42,988, 42,990–99. 
 73. Id. at 42,999, 43,232–39. NHTSA’s views on whether EPCA preempts California’s EPA-approved 
vehicle emission standards has shifted over the years. As Professor Greg Dotson details, the agency did not 
preempt California standards in the program’s first couple of decades. Greg Dotson, State Authority to Regulate 
Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Part I: History and Current Challenge, 49 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 11037, 11047–50 (2019). For most of the 2000s, the agency stated that EPCA preempted the 
California standards, but the statements did not appear to affect the agency’s fuel economy rules. Id. at 11051–
52. Once the Obama Administration came into office in 2009, NHTSA and EPA began working together on 
joint rulemaking, avoiding potential conflicts. Id. at 11053–54. 
 74. SAFE Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026, 83 Fed. Reg. at 42,999, 43,240–53. 
 75. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533). 
 76. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 Passenger 
Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. 
pts. 523, 531, 533, 536, 537). 
 77. The agencies argue that California, in seeking the waiver for the ZEV program, indicated that the 
program was designed to achieve GHG reductions and was not necessary to achieving air quality goals. SAFE 
Vehicles Rule Part One, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,337 (“[I]n the 2012-2013 . . . waiver proceeding, CARB presented 
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All of these actions present important questions of statutory interpretation. 
The analyses for each are quite distinct. To surface the specific question of 
fidelity to statutory purpose and values, this Essay focuses on NHTSA’s 
assertion that EPCA preempts California’s vehicle emission standards and ZEV 
program. 
2. NHTSA’s Preemption Rule 
EPCA’s express preemption provision prevents states from adopting “a law 
or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy 
standards for automobiles . . . .”78 NHTSA formalized its current view of 
preemption in appendices to its fuel economy regulations.79 To interpret the 
phrase “related to” in EPCA’s express preemption provision as applied to 
vehicle carbon dioxide emissions, the agency began by asserting that regulating 
carbon dioxide “relates to” fuel economy. The agency finalized the following 
regulatory language: 
(a) Express Preemption: 
(1) To the extent that any law or regulation of a State or a political subdivision of 
a State regulates or prohibits tailpipe carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles, 
such a law or regulation relates to average fuel economy standards within the 
meaning of 49 U.S.C. 32919 [EPCA’s express preemption provision].80 
NHTSA then asserted that, because carbon dioxide emissions relate to fuel 
economy, they are preempted. The new regulatory language states: 
(2) As a law or regulation related to fuel economy standards, any law or regulation 
of a State or a political subdivision of a State regulating or prohibiting tailpipe 
carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles is expressly preempted under 49 
U.S.C. 32919.81 
And, to cover the ZEV program or any other program that strongly affects 
carbon emissions, but does not explicitly regulate them, NHTSA’s regulation 
states: 
(3) A law or regulation of a State or a political subdivision of a State having the 
direct or substantial effect of regulating or prohibiting tailpipe carbon dioxide 
emissions from automobiles or automobile fuel economy is a law or regulation 
 
its ZEV program to EPA solely as a GHG compliance strategy . . . and expressly stated that the ZEV program 
did not confer NAAQS pollutant benefits.”). However, California maintains that the ZEV program (as well as 
more demanding emission standards) are essential to clean air goals, and many other states have included these 
programs in their SIPs for achieving federal air quality standards. Id. at 51,337 n.251; see also CAL. AIR RES. 
BD., ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT OF COMMENTS OF THE CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD ON THE SAFER 
AFFORDABLE FUEL-EFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR MODEL YEARS 2021-2026 PASSENGER CARS AND 
LIGHT TRUCKS 282–302 (2018), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/carbs-comments-safe-proposal (follow “CARB’s 
Comments on Federal Rollback Proposal (October 26, 2018)” hyperlink). 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 79. The regulation will be codified in 49 C.F.R. Ch. V (Appendix B to Part 531). The agency’s opinion on 
preemption is, in the end, opinion. While courts can defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory 
provision, courts carefully evaluate whether the agency interpretation is worthy of deference. See generally Kisor 
v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2410–18 (2019). 
 80. SAFE Vehicles Rule Part One, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,362. 
 81. Id. 
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related to fuel economy standards and expressly preempted under 49 U.S.C. 
32919.82 
In addition to opining on express preemption, the Agency also made 
explicit its view that EPCA impliedly preempts states’ direct and indirect carbon 
dioxide controls. The new regulation first asserts that tailpipe carbon dioxide 
emissions controls conflict with EPCA, stating: 
(b) Implied Preemption: 
(1) A law or regulation of a State or a political subdivision of a State regulating 
tailpipe carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles . . . conflicts with: 
   (A) The fuel economy standards in this part; 
  (B) The judgments made by the agency in establishing those standards; and 
   (C) The achievement of the objectives of the statute (49 U.S.C. Chapter 
329) . . . including objectives relating to reducing fuel consumption in a manner 
and to the extent consistent with manufacturer flexibility, consumer choice, and 
automobile safety.83 
The implied preemption regulation goes on to state that, in light of the 
conflict with the agency’s standards, judgments, and the achievement of its 
objectives, any state law or regulation “prohibiting tailpipe carbon dioxide 
emissions” or “having the direct or substantial effect of regulating or prohibiting 
tailpipe carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles . . . is impliedly preempted 
under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 329.”84 
3. NHTSA’s Preemption Analysis 
In considering EPCA preemption, the critical question is: What does 
“related to” mean? When might a state vehicle emissions standard or clean car 
program be “related to” a fuel economy standard, and therefore preempted by 
EPCA? As is true in any case of statutory construction, the goal is “ascertain[ing] 
Congress’s intent in enacting the federal statute at issue.”85 
Recognizing the “scant utility” of interpreting the phrase “related to” 
literally, the Supreme Court has stated, in the context of ERISA’s similar express 
preemption provision, that we look both to “‘the objectives of the ERISA statute 
as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive,’ 
as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.”86 The two 
focal points for analysis, then, are, first, the way the statutes’ objectives inform 
our understanding of whether federal and state statutes are related in a way that 
suggests congressional intent to preempt; and, second, whether the effects of the 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983). 
 86. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656). This analysis applies to determine whether the state statute “‘has a 
connection with’” the federal statute. Id. at 324 (quoting District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 
506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992)). A state statute that directly references the matters covered by the federal statute also 
relates to the federal statute. Id. at 324. 
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state law on the federal program indicate that the state law is inherently related 
to the federal law in a way suggesting Congress’s preemptive intent. 
Debates over EPCA’s preemption of California’s GHG vehicle emission 
standards have generated two strands of discussion for ascertaining 
“congressional intent” to preempt. One strand looks to the statutes’ purposes and 
values. The other strand has focused on statutory context and congressional 
actions over time that provide specific evidence of Congress’s intent to preempt 
(or preserve) California’s GHG standards. My primary focus in this Essay is on 
the first inquiry: the degree to which the agency’s interpretation engaged or 
ignored Congress’s underlying goals and values. However, in Part III.B.3, I 
briefly highlight some of the statutory features and legislative history that casts 
light on Congress’s intent to preempt or preserve California’s GHG standards. 
a. NHTSA’s Interpretation: Objectives Test 
NHTSA argued that the state vehicle emission programs undermine 
EPCA’s uniformity objective. The rule’s title, One National Program,87 
expresses this core concern. The Agency stated that “Congress’s intent to 
provide for uniform national fuel economy standards is frustrated when State 
and local actors regulate in this area.”88 The Agency stated further that the 
“primacy of a single national fuel economy standard, set by the Federal 
government, was an important objective of Congress in enacting EPCA.”89 
NHTSA also emphasized that allowing California vehicle emission 
standards would interfere with its statutorily-required balancing test. The statute 
states that, in setting “maximum feasible average fuel economy” standards, the 
agency must consider “technological feasibility, economic practicability, the 
effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and 
the need of the United States to conserve energy.”90 California’s vehicle 
emission standards, in contrast, do not require precisely the same balancing.91 
And, according to NHTSA, the ZEV mandates, like the carbon dioxide 
standards, do not consider “technological feasibility or economic practicability,” 
and, thus, do not reflect the balancing that EPCA requires for fuel economy 
standards.92 
NHTSA highlighted the impact of state standards on automakers, stating 
that they could increase automakers’ fuel economy-related expenses, which 
“would render the critical balancing required by EPCA devoid of meaning.”93 
Further, NHTSA observed that “unbound” state standards would “unjustifiably 
 
 87. SAFE Vehicles Rule Part One, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,310. 
 88. Id. at 51,313. 
 89. Id.; see also id. at 51,316–20 (discussing EPCA’s objective of creating one national program). 
 90. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2018). 
 91. SAFE Vehicles Rule Part One, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,314. 
 92. Id. at 51,314, 51,320. 
 93. Id. at 51,312; see also id. at 51,314 (“ZEV mandates require the application of additional efforts and 
resources beyond those needed to comply with Federal standards. . . . [and] also directly conflict with the goals 
of EPCA as they apply irrespective of the Federal statutory factors . . . [NHTSA] is required to consider in setting 
fuel economy standards, including technological feasibility and economic practicability.”). 
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increase manufacturers’ compliance costs, which must be either passed along to 
consumers or absorbed by the industry.”94 
NHTSA commented that “the entire purpose of a balanced standard is 
defeated if a State can place its thumb on the scale.”95 State vehicle emission 
standards “related to” national fuel economy standards would require 
manufacturers to spend resources on technology even if that technology was not 
considered appropriate under NHTSA’s multi-factor balancing test.96 The 
agency said that it must “carefully assess and balance [its range of statutory 
factors] in setting standards under EPCA, and the notion that a State has the 
unilateral ability to veto or undermine NHTSA’s determination by setting higher 
standards directly conflicts with EPCA.”97 
b. NHTSA’s Interpretation: Effects Test 
The second prong of the express preemption analysis is whether 
California’s vehicle emission standards are, in effect, fuel economy standards. 
The Agency argued that state or local requirements “relate to” fuel economy if 
they “directly or substantially affect[] corporate average fuel economy levels.”98 
Throughout its explanation of the final rule, NHTSA stressed the strong 
correlation between carbon dioxide emissions and fuel economy. The Agency 
stated that carbon dioxide emissions were the “necessary and inevitable 
byproduct of burning gasoline,” which in turn is directly related to fuel 
economy.99 Further, it noted that limiting carbon dioxide emissions had “the 
direct and substantial effect of regulating fuel consumption and, thus, is ‘related 
to’ fuel economy standards.”100 
The Agency argued that the definition of “related to . . . is a matter of 
science and mathematics.”101 The NHTSA regulations for determining 
compliance with fuel economy standards rely heavily on carbon dioxide 
emissions, demonstrating the tight relationship between fuel economy and 
carbon dioxide emissions.102 Moreover, according to NHTSA, the primary 
mechanism for reducing carbon dioxide emissions is to improve fuel 
economy.103 The Agency argued that “[t]he label a State chooses to put on its 
regulations [that is, calling them emissions standards rather than fuel economy 
standards] certainly is not dispositive in a preemption analysis.”104 
 
 94. Id. at 51,317. 
 95. Id. at 51,314. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 51,326. 
 98. Id. at 51,313. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 51,315. 
 102. Id. Although fuel economy standard compliance testing includes other substances as well, including 
carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons, NHTSA stated that carbon dioxide’s role in measuring compliance is 
“approximately 100 times greater” than the other pollutants. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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In the final rule, NHTSA argued that the ZEV program is likewise “related 
to” fuel economy standards. The agency stated that “regulations that require a 
certain number or percentage of a manufacturer’s fleet of vehicles sold in a State 
to be ZEVs that produce no carbon dioxide tailpipe emissions necessarily affect 
the fuel economy achieved by the manufacturer’s fleet . . . .”105 Prohibiting 
emissions “is the equivalent of setting a specific emissions level [at] zero,” 
which is the equivalent of requiring maximum fuel economy.106 
III. FIDELITY TO STATUTORY PURPOSE IN PREEMPTION ANALYSIS 
The statutory purposes of the laws that federal agencies are charged with 
implementing provide key insights into the appropriate relationships among 
them. NHTSA’s preemption analysis pays scant attention to California’s 
environmental goals and to the health and welfare and cooperative federalism 
purposes of the CAA, the federal statute that serves as the authorizing umbrella 
for California’s vehicle emission standards. Nor does NHTSA do justice to the 
statute it administers: the fuel-conserving EPCA. 
In this section, I work through express and implied preemption analysis. 
Although NHTSA’s final rule intertwined the discussion, I address each 
distinctly. Before embarking on the preemption analysis, however, I first note 
the ways in which California’s vehicle emission standards, a product of the 
CAA’s cooperative federalism model, do not fall neatly into a “state” or 
“federal” law basket. 
A. THE DUAL FEDERAL-STATE CHARACTER OF CALIFORNIA VEHICLE 
EMISSION STANDARDS 
Assessing the relationship between EPCA and California’s GHG standards 
is complicated by the dual state and federal nature of California’s standards. 
EPCA expressly preempts only state laws that relate to fuel economy standards, 
not federal laws. Are California’s standards state or federal? 
Though developed by the state, they are not purely state standards. 
California has the power to adopt GHG vehicle emissions standards and the ZEV 
program only because the CAA explicitly allows California—and only 
California—to develop an alternative to national standards. As noted above, 
although the CAA generally preempts state vehicle emission standards, 
Congress explicitly allowed California to have its own standards, required the 
federal EPA to waive preemption if California met certain standards, and 
allowed other states to choose California’s standards instead of the federal 
standards.107 California’s emission standards are thus an integral part of the 
federal CAA. 
If the special role of California standards in the federal scheme renders 
them “federal,” then the debate is about whether one federal statute (EPCA) 
 
 105. Id. at 51,320. 
 106. Id. at 51,321. 
 107. See supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text. 
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precludes another (the CAA),108 not about EPCA’s preemption provision, which 
preempts only state fuel economy laws. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme 
Court concluded that EPCA’s fuel economy standards did not preclude federal 
GHG vehicle emission standards under the CAA.109 If the California standards 
are considered “federal,” then the Supreme Court’s holding in Massachusetts 
would presumably preserve California’s standards from EPCA preemption. 
I do not attempt to resolve the federal versus state debate in this Essay.  
Ultimately, the federal-state dichotomy is ill-suited to statutes like the CAA, 
which have created collaborative dynamics between federal and state 
governments that defy easy categorization.110 For our purposes, I suggest that 
the quasi-federal nature of the California standards is a factor to consider in 
determining whether they represent the type of “state law” Congress intended 
EPCA to preempt. 
B.  EXPRESS PREEMPTION 
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has struggled to interpret the 
preemptive phrase used in EPCA, which preempts state laws and regulations 
“related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy standards for 
automobiles.”111 The meaning of the term “relate to” is not self-evident. 
Interpreting “relate to” in ERISA’s similar preemption provision, the Supreme 
Court has observed the “unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining 
[ERISA’s] . . . key term”—“related to.”112 The Court has also noted the risk of 
extending federal law too far. As Justice Souter wrote in a unanimous opinion, 
“[i]f ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, 
then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course, for 
‘[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere.’”113 In other words, “everything is 
related to everything else,” as Justice Scalia opined in a concurring opinion in 
another express preemption case interpreting the phrase “relate to.”114 
To assess whether Congress intended EPCA to preempt the California 
motor vehicle standards, I follow the standard Supreme Court test developed to 
interpret ERISA’s frequently-litigated preemption provision.115 I first analyze 
 
 108. A Vermont federal district court addressing whether EPCA preempts California’s GHG vehicle 
emission standards concluded that, given the integral role California’s vehicle standards play under the CAA, 
the debate is between federal laws, not federal versus state. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. 
Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 343–47 (D.Vt. 2007). 
 109. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 110. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 
EMORY L.J. 159, 166–173 (2006) (describing instances where federal and state authorities overlap expected 
jurisdictional boundaries). 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 112. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 
(1995). 
 113. Id. at 655 (second alteration in original) (quoting HENRY JAMES, RODERICK HUDSON xli (New York 
ed., World’s Classics 1980)). 
 114. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 115. I do not address the role of the Court’s customary presumption against preemption of state laws. The 
Supreme Court had long found a presumption against preemption of state laws, recognizing the importance of 
allowing states to exercise their traditional police powers. See, e.g., Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at 331 (“[W]e 
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statutory purposes to assess the scope of the state law Congress intended to 
allow, and then turn to the implications of overlapping effects, an inquiry that is 
also informed by statutory purposes. I then briefly discuss a few highlights based 
on statutory structure and legislative history that also cast light on whether 
Congress intended to preempt or permit California’s GHG emission standards. 
1. Congressional Purposes Analysis 
The relationship between state and federal objectives helps determine 
whether the state law relates to the federal law and, accordingly, whether 
Congress would have intended to preempt the state law. In California Division 
of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, an ERISA case 
interpreting the term “relate to” in the scope of that statute’s preemption clause, 
the Supreme Court noted that a state law’s focus on wages and substantive 
standards was “remote from the areas with which ERISA is expressly 
concerned . . . .”116 Citing an earlier ERISA case, the Court observed that 
preempting substantive state law in areas “where ERISA has nothing to say 
would be ‘unsettling.’”117 Dillingham Construction reveals that a key inquiry is 
how the respective purposes of the federal and state laws contribute to our 
understanding of whether the state law “relates to” the federal law. Thus, 
assessing the relationship between EPCA’s objectives and California’s vehicle 
emission standards’ objectives is a helpful mechanism for interpreting whether 
the emission standards “relate to” the fuel economy standards. 
As explained above, according to NHTSA, EPCA’s fundamental goals are 
to create “one national program” of fuel economy standards and to develop fuel 
economy standards that balance a range of factors, including economic and 
practical feasibility and consumer choice.118 NHTSA’s selective focus on these 
goals fails to acknowledge EPCA’s broader purposes and how California’s 
vehicle emission standards relate to them. 
 EPCA’s broad purpose is to reduce U.S. reliance on foreign oil and, in the 
context of the fuel economy standards, to increase fuel efficiency. EPCA arose 
in response to the OPEC oil embargo in the early 1970s, which led to 
skyrocketing oil prices, oil shortages, long lines at gas stations, and serious 
 
are reluctant to alter our ordinary ‘assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). However, 
a recent case stated that, where a federal statute contains an express preemption provision, courts should rely 
only on the statute’s plain language and that the presumption against preemption does not apply. See 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016). That 
statement is curious because statutory language is often ambiguous in application, and presumptions are useful 
tools for resolving ambiguities. It is also possible that the Court intended to forego the presumption against 
preemption of state law only where the statute’s preemptive language is “plain,” not ambiguous. Be that as it 
may, given the doubts that the Court has cast, the preemption discussion in this Essay will proceed without 
reference to the presumption against preemption. 
 116. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at 330. 
 117. Id. (quoting N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 
665 (1995)). 
 118. SAFE Vehicles Rule Part One, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,314. 
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economic repercussions.119 Through a wide range of mechanisms, Congress 
sought to insulate the United States from these harms by reducing dependence 
on foreign oil.120 EPCA explicitly articulates Congress’s intent to reduce oil 
demand, stating: “The purposes of this chapter are . . . to conserve energy 
supplies through energy conservation programs . . . [and] to provide for 
improved energy efficiency of motor vehicles.”121 
California’s GHG vehicle emission standards, in contrast, are not designed 
to reduce our dependence on foreign oil, but to reduce the transportation sector’s 
contribution to global warming. The State legislature found that “[t]he control 
and reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases are critical to slow the effects of 
global warming,”122 and that “[p]assenger vehicles and light-duty trucks are 
responsible for approximately 40 percent of the total greenhouse gas pollution 
in the state.”123 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court recognized that vehicle GHG 
emission standards and EPCA’s fuel economy standards serve different 
purposes. Although Massachusetts addressed the contention that EPCA 
precluded federal—not state—GHG vehicle emissions standards, the Court’s 
treatment of the different purposes served by these laws informs our 
understanding of the relationship between vehicle emission standards, on the one 
hand, and fuel economy standards, on the other. The Court stated: 
EPA has been charged with protecting the public’s ‘health’ and ‘welfare,’ a 
statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT [Department of Transportation]’s 
mandate to promote energy efficiency. The two obligations may overlap, but there 
is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and 
yet avoid inconsistency.124 
The standards set to achieve one objective—reducing GHG emissions—could 
be very different from the standards set to resolve a different objective: 
conserving oil to reduce dependence upon foreign sources. Given the increasing 
urgency of reducing GHG emissions to reduce climate change impacts, it is not 
surprising that California’s GHG emission standards and ZEV program are more 
stringent than NHTSA’s current fuel economy standards, which were designed 
to reduce reliance on foreign oil. 
 
 119. See ROBERT BAMBERGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, IB90122, AUTOMOBILE AND LIGHT TRUCK 
FUEL ECONOMY: THE CAFE STANDARDS 1, 3 (2003); Greg Myre, The 1973 Arab Oil Embargo: The Old Rules 
No Longer Apply, NPR (Oct. 16, 2013, 12:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/10/15/ 
234771573/the-1973-arab-oil-embargo-the-old-rules-no-longer-apply; Greg Dotson, State Authority to Regulate 
Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Part 2: A Legislative and Statutory History Assessment, GEO. 
ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 11–15), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3455700; Paul Sabin, Crisis and Continuity in U.S. Oil Politics, 1965–1980, 99 J. AM. HIST. 177, 183 (2012). 
 120. See BAMBERGER, supra note 119, at 3. In addition to requiring increases in fuel efficiency, EPCA 
contained measures to increase domestic fuel supplies, buffer potential oil shortages by creating the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve, and encourage energy conservation. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975). 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (2018). 
 122. A.B. 1493, 2001–02 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2002) (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42823 and 
adding § 43018.5). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)). 
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Moreover, although the purpose of EPCA’s preemption provision was to 
create uniform federal fuel economy standards, that is not the purpose at issue 
in determining whether the state statute “relates to” the federal statute. The 
relevant inquiry is whether the federal statute’s substantive purpose—here, 
reducing dependence on foreign oil—encompasses the scope of the state 
statute’s function—here, reducing GHG emissions. EPCA’s oil conservation 
purpose suggests that it does not encompass the broader environmental purpose 
served by the state’s GHG standards. By avoiding EPCA’s overarching statutory 
purpose, NHTSA failed to properly interpret EPCA’s preemption provision. 
NHTSA’s assertion that the vehicle emission standards sabotage EPCA’s 
purposes because they do not balance the same factors is, fundamentally, a claim 
that the emission standards conflict with (rather than relate to) fuel economy 
standards. Instead, this argument pertains to “conflict preemption,” a form of 
implied preemption, and is discussed below, in Part III.C.125 
2. Role of State Statute’s “Effects” in Interpreting “Related To” 
As noted above, in the ERISA context, the Dillingham Court stated that 
“the nature of the effect of the state law”126 on the federal program was also 
relevant to assessing when a state statute is connected with and so “relates to” a 
federal statute, thereby revealing congressional intent to preempt. While a state 
program’s direct and indirect effects on a federal program are relevant, they do 
not, per se, lead to preemption. The courts have recognized that state laws can 
affect matters covered by federal laws without necessarily “relating to” and 
being preempted by them.127 If any state law affecting matters covered by a 
federal statute were deemed to “relate to” that statute and be preempted, federal 
preemption would reach much farther than Congress likely intended.128 
Ultimately, the “effects” test does not operate in the abstract. A state law’s 
effects are relevant to the degree they cast light on whether the state statute 
“relates to” the federal statute in a way that indicates congressional intent to 
preempt. 
As noted above, NHTSA argues that the ZEV program affects EPCA’s fuel 
economy standards.129 That assertion is implausible. EPCA requires 
manufacturers to develop cars that use less fuel, a requirement that is focused on 
 
 125. See infra Part III.C. 
 126. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S 316, 325 (1997). This analysis 
applies to determine whether the state statute “has a ‘connection with’” the federal statute. Id. A state statute that 
directly references the matters covered by the federal statute also “relates to” the federal statute. Id. at 324. 
 127. See N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 662 (1995) 
(concluding that state law having an indirect impact on the costs of health plans does not “relate to” ERISA and 
is not preempted). 
 128. See Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at 329 (observing, in the ERISA context, that if ERISA covered all 
state actions affecting the costs of benefits, “we could scarcely see the end of ERISA’s pre-emptive reach, and 
the words ‘relate to’ would limit nothing”). 
 129. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 51,310, 51,321 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533) (suggesting 
that requiring zero-emission vehicles “is the equivalent of setting a specific emissions level—zero,” which is, in 
turn, the same as requiring “maximum” fuel economy). 
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efficiency.130 All existing fuel economy standards impose mile-per-gallon fuel 
use requirements.131 California’s ZEV program, in contrast, takes an entirely 
different tack, with very different effects on manufacturers. The ZEV program 
does not impose efficiency requirements on vehicles’ internal combustion 
engines. Instead, it imposes a design requirement.132 The program forces 
manufacturers to come up with new technologies for powering vehicles, like 
electricity or hydrogen fuel cells, not improvements in fuel efficiency.133 The 
effects of the ZEV program on manufacturers are thus very different from the 
effects of fuel economy standards and, accordingly, do not relate to fuel 
economy standards. 
In contrast, vehicle GHG emissions controls are, as NHTSA observed, 
likely to have a substantial effect on fuel economy. NHTSA emphasized that 
“[t]he label a State chooses to put on its regulations certainly is not dispositive 
in a preemption analysis.”134 NHTSA stated further that “[a]rguments focused 
on form, or worse—labels—over substance are not persuasive.”135 In other 
words, NHTSA appeared to be suggesting that the vehicle standards’ effects on 
fuel economy mean that California is hiding a fuel economy standard in a vehicle 
emission standard’s clothing. 
Notwithstanding the GHG standards’ strong overlap in effects, however, 
the fundamental inquiry is whether the overlap means that GHG vehicle 
emissions standards are “related to” fuel economy standards such that we can 
assume Congress intended to preempt them. It is again important to ground the 
analysis in statutory purpose, because that inquiry can help determine whether 
the state’s regulation is hiding a preempted standard behind a false label. 
Here, although GHG vehicle emissions standards affect fuel economy, the 
state and federal statutes are serving different (though not necessarily 
inconsistent) purposes. NHTSA, in setting fuel economy standards, is focused 
on conserving fuel. California, in setting GHG vehicle emission standards, is 
striving to set limits that will address the existential threat of climate change. 
Although the effects of each standard are similar, the similarity in effects does 
not mean that the one is the same as the other. Because the California standards 
serve a legitimate and distinct statutory purpose, they are not fuel economy 
standards by another name; the California standards address the transportation 
sector’s substantial role in causing climate change, not EPCA’s more limited 
fuel conservation purpose.136 
 
 130. See 42 U.S.C. § 6201(5) (2018) (stating EPCA’s purpose is “to provide for improved energy efficiency 
of motor vehicles”). 
 131. 49 C.F.R. § 531.5(a) (2019) (stating that fuel economy standards must be “expressed in miles per 
gallon”). 
 132. See Zero Emission Vehicle Program: About, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-
work/programs/zero-emission-vehicle-program/about (last visited June 28, 2020) (requiring manufacturers to 
produce “the very cleanest cars available” using technology such as full battery-electric, hydrogen fuel cell, and 
plug-in hybrid electric). 
 133. Id. 
 134. SAFE Vehicles Rule Part One, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,315. 
 135. Id. at 51,316. 
 136. See Dotson, supra note 73, at 11066 (concluding that, given the consensus about climate change and 
the need for action, there is little possibility that courts would consider California’s emission standards a pretext 
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Another example reveals the value of statutory purpose analysis in 
assessing the implications of overlapping effects. If overlapping effects 
automatically triggered preemption, then state speed limits could be preempted 
by EPCA because automobile speeds significantly impact fuel economy.137 But 
no one would argue that Congress intended EPCA to preempt state speed limits.  
Notwithstanding overlapping effects, most state speed limits serve such different 
purposes from EPCA’s fuel economy standards that Congress could hardly have 
intended EPCA to preempt them. Because GHG emission standards, like speed 
limits, serve purposes that are distinct from EPCA’s, the overlapping effects do 
not prove that California was attempting to insidiously legislate in an area 
reserved to NHTSA.138 Statutory purposes provide a touchstone that prevents 
“effects” analysis from contributing to an overly expansive view of federal 
preemption. Grounding “effects” analysis in the statutes’ respective statutory 
purposes helps distinguish state laws attempting to avoid preemption from state 
laws serving distinct objectives that do not relate to the federal statute. 
3. Statutory Structure and Context 
Although the primary focus of this Essay is the importance of grounding 
preemption analysis in the respective statutes’ overarching purposes, statutory 
structure and legislative history also provide important insights into the specific 
question of whether Congress intended to preempt California’s GHG vehicle 
emission standards. Advocates for and defenders of NHTSA’s preemption rule 
have intensively parsed EPCA’s statutory structure and legislative history for 
indicia of Congress’s intent to preempt California’s GHG standards. I highlight 
a few of the many arguments. 
The clearest evidence that Congress recognized that vehicle emission 
standards affect fuel economy standards, but that that affect does not trigger 
preemption is in the factors NHTSA must consider in developing fuel economy 
standards.139 EPCA explicitly states that NHTSA, in setting fuel economy 
standards, must take into account the effect of other vehicle emission standards 
on fuel economy.140 The provision indicates that, rather than preempting vehicle 
 
for prohibited fuel economy standards); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. 
Supp. 2d 295, 351–53 (D. Vt. 2007) (observing that California’s GHG standards “embrace much more than a 
simple requirement to improve fuel economy, cloaked in the rhetoric of reducing carbon dioxide emissions”). 
 137. See Driving More Efficiently, FUELECONOMY.GOV, https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/driveHabits. 
jsp#:~:text=While%20each%20vehicle%20reaches%20its,%240.14%20per%20gallon%20for%20gas.&text=O
bserving%20the%20speed%20limit%20is%20also%20safer (last visited June 28, 2020) (stating that “gas 
mileage usually decreases rapidly at speeds above 50 mph”); see also Green Mountain, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 353 
(observing that the expression “‘relate to’ could be interpreted to include virtually all state provisions with even 
a tangential connection to fuel economy”); Dotson, supra note 73, at 11059–61 (observing that NHTSA’s 
preemption argument could impact an uncertain range of state and local laws, including speed limits). 
 138. See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1175 (E.D. Cal. 2007) 
(“Congress did not intend that EPCA should preempt state laws that serve purposes different from EPCA, but 
which may have some effect on fuel economy as a byproduct of their enforcement.”). 
 139. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2018). 
 140. Id. The lower courts addressing EPCA preemption of California’s vehicle emission standards found 
EPCA’s accommodation of vehicle emission standards an important attribute in deciding that EPCA did not 
preempt GHG standards. See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1168–70 (indicating that EPCA’s 
admonition that NHTSA “shall consider” vehicle emission standards evidences congressional intent that 
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emission standards, EPCA requires NHTSA to accommodate their impact on 
fuel economy. 
Professor Greg Dotson’s in-depth analysis of EPCA’s legislative history 
demonstrates that Congress initially included this provision because Congress 
was concerned that vehicle emission standards would have a negative effect on 
fuel economy.141 EPCA’s requirement that NHTSA consider other vehicle 
emission standards in developing its fuel economy standards allowed NHTSA 
to lessen fuel economy standards if needed to meet CAA public health goals. 
Over time, it became clear that vehicle emission standards might enhance rather 
than impede fuel economy,142 raising the prospect that the emission standards 
were “related to” and might be preempted by EPCA. 
When Congress amended EPCA in 2007, in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s Massachusetts v. EPA case affirming EPA authority to regulate 
greenhouse gases, Congress’s assumption that EPCA did not preempt federal or 
state vehicle GHG programs was revealed by active debates over whether to 
preempt them, debates that presumed that the standards were not otherwise 
preempted.143 Notwithstanding legislative and White House efforts to eliminate 
EPA’s and the states’ ability to adopt vehicle GHG emission standards,144 the 
Energy Independence and Security Act, which amended EPCA, did not limit 
that authority and, instead, included a savings clause intended to preserve state 
and federal environmental authority over GHGs.145 
NHTSA suggests that EPCA’s plain preemptive language is more 
determinative of congressional intent than these legislative developments, and 
that lawmaker statements about preserving federal and state authority to regulate 
vehicle GHG emissions do not override EPCA’s statutory preemption 
language.146 However, where the plain language is inherently ambiguous, as is 
the case with the words “related to,” and the objective is discerning 
congressional intent to preempt, legislative history can inform, even if it does 
not determine, statutory interpretation. 
 
NHTSA must conform to what EPA deems is necessary, and so EPCA does not preclude GHG vehicle emission 
standards); Green Mountain, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (“[T]he term ‘other motor vehicle standards of the 
Government’ continues to include both emission standards issued by EPA and emission standards for which 
EPA has issued a waiver under section 209(b) of the [Clean Air Act] . . . .” (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f))). 
These courts also concluded that EPCA’s requirement that NHTSA consider “other vehicle emission standards” 
included California standards that had received an EPA preemption waiver. Centr. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1173; Green Mountain, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 345–47. 
 141. Dotson, supra note 119, at 9–10, 15–30. 
 142. Id. at 33 (explaining that, as Congress considered amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1977, it 
recognized that vehicle emission standards can improve fuel economy). 
 143. Id. at 41–44 (“During floor debate as the legislation received final approval in Congress, legislators 
voiced the view that both EPA and California retained their preexisting authority to establish and enforce tailpipe 
standards for greenhouse gases. Those views went unrebutted.” (footnote omitted)). A subsidiary line of 
legislative and statutory history queries whether EPCA’s reference to “other motor vehicle standards” refers 
only to federal emission standards, not California standards. For discussion of that debate, see infra notes 161–
62 and accompanying text. 
 144. Id. at 41–56. 
 145. Id. at 55–56, 64–70; Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 3, 121 
Stat. 1492, 1498 (2007). 
 146. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 51,310, 51,321 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533). 
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In sum, where applying an express preemption provision is inherently 
ambiguous, explicit statutory purposes shape our understanding of congressional 
intent to preempt. Here, EPCA’s scope, focused on fuel conservation, suggests 
that Congress did not intend to preempt a state law addressing environmental 
impacts like climate change. And, notwithstanding the GHG standards’ 
overlapping effects with the fuel economy standards, a concern that California 
has attempted to engage in preempted activity by artful labeling is belied by the 
clear differences between EPCA’s and the California standards’ purposes. The 
statutory structure and history further suggest that Congress did not intend for 
EPCA to preempt vehicle emission standards, notwithstanding their overlapping 
effects. 
C.  IMPLIED PREEMPTION 
According to NHTSA, even if EPCA does not expressly preempt 
California’s vehicle standards, Congress impliedly preempted them.147  
Congressional intent to imply preemption is found where a federal statute 
“occupies the field” addressed by the state statute or where the state statute 
conflicts with the federal statute.148 Here, NHTSA asserts conflict preemption, 
arguing that California’s programs interfere with EPCA’s objectives by 
undermining its goal of having uniform national fuel economy standards for 
automobile manufacturers149 and undermining EPCA’s multi-factor balancing 
test.150 
To analyze implied preemption, I first assess the degree of conflict or 
harmony between the core purposes of EPCA and California’s GHG vehicle 
emission standards. I then move beyond the implied preemption test, which 
addresses the relationship between federal and state enactments, and consider 
the quasi-federal nature of California’s vehicle emission standards. Because the 
CAA explicitly allows the California standards as part of its regulatory scheme, 
invalidating the California standards implicates the purposes of the CAA and 
adds another dimension to discerning congressional intent to preempt. 
1. Conflict or Harmony Between Core Purposes? 
NHTSA is correct that EPCA and the California clean air requirements 
have differing goals and could thus lead to differing requirements. As suggested 
above, to address the looming consequences of climate change, the CAA’s 
public health and welfare goals may well require auto manufacturers to 
substantially reduce GHG emissions, indirectly increasing fuel economy beyond 
NHTSA’s requirements. 
Nonetheless, NHTSA’s selective articulation of EPCA’s purposes 
overstates the degree of conflict. The “one national program” that NHTSA now 
 
 147. Id. at 51,313. 
 148. Robert N. Weiner, The Height of Presumption: Preemption and the Role of the Courts, 32 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 727, 731–32 (2009) (describing field and conflict preemption as forms of implied preemption). 
 149. SAFE Vehicles Rule Part One, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,313. 
 150. Id. 
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promotes reflects the purpose of EPCA’s preemption provision, not the statute’s 
overarching objectives. As noted above, EPCA’s fundamental purpose is 
reducing oil consumption and reliance on foreign oil.151 In its argument that 
GHG standards are “related to” fuel economy standards, NHTSA repeatedly 
states that mechanisms to reduce GHG emissions will also reduce fuel 
consumption.152 GHG vehicle emission standards are therefore likely to serve, 
not conflict with, EPCA’s core statutory purpose.153 
NHTSA’s argument that California’s GHG standards conflict with 
NHTA’s balancing test elevates the balancing-test factors beyond their 
appropriate role. The economic and technological feasibility factors that 
NHTSA must consider in setting fuel economy standards are qualifications on 
EPCA’s central purpose: fuel conservation.154 Moreover, the tension between 
the standards is overstated. California’s vehicle emission standards also take 
economic and technological feasibility into account. In order to obtain a waiver, 
California must meet the criteria the CAA specifies for vehicle emission 
standards,155 criteria that consider cost and feasibility. The federal vehicle 
emission standard parameters California must meet to be eligible for a waiver 
state that standards should “reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction 
achievable through the application of [available] technology . . . giving 
appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety[.]”156 Although the 
standard-setting criteria are not identical, there is more consistency, and less 
conflict, than NHTSA implies.157 
From a practical standpoint, recent collaboration among NHTSA, EPA, 
and California reveals the potential for workable collaboration and belies the 
assertion of inevitable conflict. As discussed above, NHTSA and EPA, in 
coordination with California, worked together to develop federal GHG vehicle 
emission standards, demonstrating that all agencies were capable of releasing 
compatible standards true to their respective missions.158 
Whatever the compatibility perceived by a prior administration, however, 
this Administration perceives conflict. If there is a conflict, the key question is 
whether Congress intended that conflict to lead to EPCA’s preemption of 
California’s vehicle emission standards. 
 
 151. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 152. See, e.g., SAFE Vehicle Rule Part One, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,319 (“[R]egulation of tailpipe carbon dioxide 
emissions has a direct and undeniably substantial effect on fuel economy.”). 
 153. See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1177 (E.D. Cal. 2007) 
(observing that EPA’s mandate to protect public health and welfare and DOT’s mandate to establish fuel 
efficiency “are aligned,” and the goals are mutually reinforcing). 
 154. As a California district court concluded in assessing preemption, NHTSA should not conflate EPCA’s 
overarching objective with the “factors against which that objective should be balanced.” Id. The court stated 
that considerations like price, consumer choice, safety, and dealer profitability are not EPCA’s goals, they are 
simply “factors against which the possibility of increased fuel efficiency is weighed in order to determine 
feasibility.” Id. 
 155. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2018). 
 156. Id. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i). 
 157. See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 338 (D. Vt. 
2007) (observing that the state agency considered virtually the same factors that NHTSA considers in setting 
fuel economy standards, although its economic analysis focused on California). 
 158. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
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As noted above, Congress anticipated and addressed the potential for 
conflict between EPCA’s fuel economy goals and the CAA’s health and welfare 
goals. One of the explicit factors EPCA must consider in developing fuel 
economy standards is “the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the 
Government on fuel economy.”159 In other words, if they conflict, NHTSA must 
adjust potential fuel economy standards to accommodate existing vehicle 
emission standards designed to meet the CAA’s health and welfare goals.160 
A key controversy is whether this accommodation includes not only federal 
vehicle emission standards, but also California vehicle emission standards that 
have received an EPA waiver. NHTSA now contends that EPCA requires it to  
accommodate only federal emission standards and not state standards, which are 
preempted by EPCA.161 In contrast, the district courts that have analyzed this 
question have parsed EPCA’s statutory history differently, and concluded that, 
if there is a conflict, Congress intended EPCA to accommodate California as 
well as federal standards.162 This Essay is not the place to wind through the 
complex statutory, legislative, and regulatory history on this question. Instead, 
in the next section, I turn again to statutory purposes: Congress’s goals in 
intentionally giving California a key role in developing vehicle emission 
standards. 
2. One National Program (EPCA) Meets Two National Programs (CAA) 
This is not your garden-variety federal versus state conflict preemption 
scenario. The dual federal-state nature of California vehicle emission standards 
is relevant to analyzing whether Congress intended EPCA to preempt California 
vehicle emission standards or, instead, to take them into account. Because the 
California standards were adopted as part of the federal CAA’s two-option 
 
 159. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2018). This statutory language is significant in multiple ways. It demonstrates 
that Congress recognized vehicle standards as distinct from, and not “related to,” fuel economy standards, see 
supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text, as well as evidencing Congress’s intent that, should conflict arise, 
Congress intended to prioritize, not impliedly preempt, the CAA standards. 
 160. See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1167–70 (stating that NHTSA must conform to 
EPA standards, not the other way around, and that, “[g]iven the level of impairment of human health and welfare 
that current climate science indicates may occur . . . it would be the very definition of folly if EPA were 
precluded from action simply because the level of decrease in greenhouse gas output is incompatible with 
existing mileage standards under EPCA”). 
 161. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 Passenger 
Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Feg. Reg. 42,986, 43,236–37 (proposed Aug. 24, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 85, 86; 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536, 537) (arguing that NHTSA was required to consider California 
standards for only a limited time period, which ended in 1994 when Congress removed outdated provisions). 
The final rule did not repeat these arguments, instead incorporating the just-described explanation in the 
proposal. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 51,310, 51,323 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533). 
 162. Centr. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 (observing that, when EPCA was adopted in 
1975, “Congress unequivocally stated that federal standards included EPA-approved California emissions 
standards”). The court noted that, although Congress revised this language in 1994, the modifications merely 
removed unnecessary language and did not effect any substantive change. Id.; see also Green Mountain, 508 F. 
Supp. 2d at 346 (stating that, although less explicit about including California standards after the 1994 revisions, 
“the term ‘other motor vehicle standards of the Government’ continues to include both emission standards issued 
by EPA and emission standards for which EPA has issued a waiver . . . as it did when enacted in 1975”). 
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approach to vehicle emission standards, the CAA’s purposes, not just EPCA’s 
purposes, matter. 
While the goal of “one national program” may be key to EPCA, having 
two national standards is key to the CAA. The CAA, in contrast to EPCA, 
explicitly and intentionally created a variant of cooperative federalism to allow 
and promote California’s unique ability to set alternative vehicle emission 
standards that would then give all states the option of adopting either the federal 
or the California standards.163 NHTSA’s insistence on its singular program 
conflicts with the CAA’s commitment to a vehicle standards program offering 
two options. 
Congress has consistently retained California’s unique ability to develop a 
contrasting set of vehicle emission standards. As noted above, when California 
choked in vehicle-induced smog in the 1960s, California developed the nation’s 
first vehicle emission controls, which Congress allowed California to retain.164 
In Ann Carlson’s words, Congress decided to make California a 
“superregulator,” with special federally granted powers beyond those of other 
states.165 By the 1977 CAA Amendments, Congress went a step further, turning 
California’s option into a second national option.166 Although the CAA still 
preempts non-California states from adopting their own vehicle emission 
standards, other states can adopt either federal or California standards.167 
By creating a two-option approach in the CAA, Congress could balance 
the competing values served by consistency and state autonomy. The impact on 
uniformity is small because the CAA limits the number of options facing auto 
manufacturers to two: the federal standard and the California standard.168 At the 
same time, allowing variation gives each state at least some flexibility to choose 
the standard that best meets its preferences. The states are not constrained to one 
option: they have the benefit of the federal option or a more stringent option (the 
California option). 
Furthermore, one of the goals of the CAA’s two-option approach is to 
generate more technological innovation than would occur with a single 
standard.169 Over the years, California has provided a “laboratory” of innovation 
that has prompted automakers to develop new pollution controls. Once tried out 
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in California and in the states adopting California standards, the federal 
government has been more willing to adopt increasingly stringent national 
vehicle emission controls.170 The existence of two options has avoided 
stagnation and prompted a dynamic improvement in standards.171 
Eliminating California’s ability to establish a second option for GHG 
emission standards seriously undermines Congress’s statutory goal of giving 
states two options and the systemic benefits of that approach. Although the 
federal GHG vehicle emission standards had tracked the California standards,172 
EPA’s April 2020 decision to roll them back means that the federal standards 
will become less stringent than the California standards. With NHTSA’s 
determination that EPCA preempts the California GHG standards, California, 
and the thirteen states that had adopted GHG vehicle emission controls,173 will 
not be able to respond to the rollback by maintaining the California standards, 
their chosen GHG emissions option. 
NHTSA’s preemption of the ZEV program will, at least in the short term, 
have even more significant consequences. The ZEV program is considered the 
primary driver of alternatives to the internal combustion engine. Given 
automaker resistance to developing new technology, commenters have observed 
that the program has been critical to inducing technological change.174 Although 
lukewarm consumer interest and insufficient charging infrastructure continue to 
hold back electric vehicle sales in the short term, vehicle electrification is 
considered essential to decarbonization.175 The federal government’s GHG 
standards do not include a ZEV mandate, so preemption eliminates that entire 
dimension of vehicle controls for California and the ten other states that have 
relied on it.176 
California’s GHG vehicle emissions standards and ZEV program emerged 
from the CAA’s two-option approach. NHTSA’s invocation of EPCA’s “one 
national program” goal must be juxtaposed with Congress’s purposeful creation 
 
 170. See Carlson, supra note 164, at 1115–17 (describing a series of California vehicle emission standards 
that EPA subsequently adopted); id. at 1118–19 (describing federal Clean Air Act amendments requiring vehicle 
emissions standards that California had previously adopted); Freeman, supra note 50 (describing the federal 
government’s adoption of GHG vehicle emission standards similar to those initially adopted by California). 
 171. Engel, supra note 110, at 171–72 (describing the positive EPA-California dynamic that led to evolving 
vehicle emission standards). 
 172. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 174. McConnell et al., supra note 60, at 16–18 (“It is not an exaggeration to suggest that most of the increase 
in innovation and demand for vehicle batteries has been as a result of the California ZEV program, which other 
US states and several other countries have also joined.”). 
 175. See ETHAN ELKIND & TED LAMM, U.C. BERKELEY CTR. LAW, ENERGY, & ENV’T, SYMPOSIUM BRIEF: 
ELECTRIC VEHICLES AND GLOBAL URBAN ADOPTION: POLICY SOLUTIONS FROM FRANCE AND CALIFORNIA 1 
(2019), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Electric-Vehicles-and-Global-Urban-Adop 
tion.pdf. The ZEV program is also central to California’s long-term air pollution concerns. Because NHTSA’s 
proposal preserves the state’s ability to adopt programs to address criteria pollutants, however, I am not 
addressing that aspect of the program in this Essay. It is possible that California would be able to apply for a 
waiver for its ZEV program based only on criteria emission benefits, the basis on which the program was first 
established. McConnell et al., supra note 60, at 3 (observing that ZEV program was initially designed to address 
local air quality concerns). 
 176. CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 49. 
1206 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:1177 
of a two-state option in the CAA. Concluding that Congress intended EPCA to 
preempt the California standards would run counter to Congress’s goals under 
the CAA. 
In sum, a serious reckoning with EPCA’s and the CAA’s purposes casts 
doubt on NHTSA’s conclusion that EPCA impliedly preempts California’s 
federally authorized GHG vehicle emission standards. NHTSA’s conflict 
preemption analysis misses EPCA’s central fuel conservation purpose and so 
perceives conflict rather than harmony between EPCA’s fuel economy standards 
and GHG vehicle emission standards. And NHTSA’s one-sided analysis focuses 
only on the impact of California’s standards on EPCA’s purposes, without also 
considering Congress’s goal, under the CAA, of allowing California to create a 
second vehicle emission standard option that would offer nationwide benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
NHTSA’s preemption regulation reveals an agency unmoored from the 
explicit statutory purposes driving its authorizing statute and the central 
purposes of the CAA. When agencies detach from statutory purposes, they are 
likely to undermine, not serve congressional intent. Although statutory language 
is often ambiguous and agencies deserve deference for their expertise and 
experience, agencies risk following purely partisan agendas if they fail to honor 
the core statutory objectives they have been tasked with implementing. 
In this instance, NHTSA’s preemption regulation, along with the rest of the 
car standards rollback, appears to be serving a profoundly deregulatory 
agenda.177 A presidential administration is entitled to its views on the wisdom or 
folly of the administrative state, but it cannot regulate in a vacuum. Statutory 
purposes remain a critical touchstone for determining congressional intent and, 
in this case, congressional intent to preempt. 
The vehicle emissions rollback, like many of the Administration’s 
rollbacks, is not a minor shift. Administrative agencies’ interpretations of their 
authorizing statutes have enormous consequences. Climate change is happening, 
and only major efforts to reduce our most significant emissions sources, like 
vehicles, will protect future generations. Insufficient fidelity to EPCA’s 
conservation purposes and the CAA’s (and California’s) health and welfare 
goals is exacerbating the specter of catastrophic climate change. 
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